| INTRODUCTION
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) was first identified in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) in September 2012 (Zaki, van Boheemen, Bestebroer, Osterhaus, & Fouchier, 2012) . It is a group C betacoronavirus, distantly related to the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) which caused an outbreak of severe respiratory illness in 2002 -2003 .
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus also causes a similar acute respiratory illness, and as of December 2017, 2103 cases have been confirmed in 27 countries with 733 deaths (35% case fatality ratio) (World Health Organization, 2017) . Infection has been diagnosed in multiple countries, but all cases have an epidemiologic link to the Middle East.
Like SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV is thought to be of animal origin.
Investigations of bats and other animals have found near identical sequences, including MERS-CoV in camels Corman et al., 2014; Hemida et al., 2014; Raj et al., 2014; Reusken, Farag, et al., 2014; Reusken, Messadi, et al., 2014) . Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus can replicate efficiently in the upper respiratory tract of dromedary camels (referred to hereafter as "camels") (Adney et al., 2014) . Further studies identified that the MERS-CoV receptor, dipeptidyl peptidase 4 (DPP4), is relatively conserved among mammals, suggesting a likelihood of cross-species transmission . However, only camels and alpacas have been found seropositive (Reusken, Ababneh, et al., 2013; Reusken et al., 2016) , and the virus has only been isolated from camels (Hemida et al., 2014; Raj et al., 2014; Reusken, Ababneh, et al., 2013) . The evidence suggests that MERS-CoV may jump between other mammals and camels, and that camels play a role as an intermediate host that transmits MERSCoV directly to humans (Al Hammadi et al., 2015; Anthony et al., 2017; Azhar et al., 2014; Drosten, Kellam, & Memish, 2014; Memish et al., 2014; Nowotny & Kolodziejek, 2014; Sabir et al., 2016) .
Based on phylogenetic analysis of MERS-CoV genomes, it appears that there have been multiple, independent zoonotic introductions of MERS-CoV into the human population, resulting in the observed human MERS-CoV diversity . Nosocomial transmission has accounted for several clusters associated with multiple hospitals in the KSA Memish, Al-Tawfiq, & Assiri, 2013) . Human-to-human transmission appears to require extended close contact with an infected individual. Consequently, most of the clusters have occurred in families and healthcare workers.
Tertiary transmission was observed with the 2015 outbreak of MERSCoV in South Korea (Cho et al., 2016; Park et al., 2015) .
The first half of 2014 saw a large increase in the number of MERS-CoV cases, including clusters in hospitals and household settings in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These larger outbreaks raise the question of whether these outbreak-associated strains have enhanced transmissibility (Drosten, Muth, et al., 2014) . SARS-CoV acquired characteristic genetic changes as the virus was sampled from humans during the early epidemic, suggesting that these mutations may play a role in either replication fitness or transmissibility (Bolles, Donaldson, & Baric, 2011; Chinese Sars Molecular Epidemiology Consortium, 2004; Song et al., 2005; Wong, Li, Moore, Choe, & Farzan, 2004) . Genome sequencing of MERS-CoV is critical in understanding molecular determinants of pathogenesis and in understanding transmission patterns.
As part of the response to the increased numbers of MERS-CoV cases and clusters in and around Abu Dhabi, respiratory samples were collected from patients with MERS and contacts along with extensive epidemiological data (Hunter et al., 2016) . In this study, to understand how genomics can help resolve questions of transmission, full MERSCoV genomes from 19 of the 2013-2014 MERS clinical samples were sequenced and analysed, along with four additional partial sequences (spike and nucleocapsid genes). These cases include patients from three hospital-associated clusters, three household-associated clusters and three sporadic cases from the UAE (Al Hunter et al., 2016) . Additionally, due to the risk factors associated with contact with dromedary camels, respiratory samples were collected from camels at farms near where the human cases originated.
Full MERS-CoV genomes were sequenced from six of the camel samples to better understand the role of animals in these outbreaks and in the recent evolution of the virus.
| MATERIALS AND METHODS

| MERS-CoV human case clusters and sample collection
A total of 65 patients with MERS-CoV were identified during our investigation in the UAE from July 2013 through May 2014. Of 65 patients, there were six known clusters of human-to-human MERSCoV transmission and other sporadic cases verified by extensive epidemiological investigation Hunter et al., 2016 • This study shows the close genetic relationship between the MERS-CoV virus genome sequences transmitted within outbreak clusters in the United Arab Emirates, which will aid in future epidemiological studies.
• Camels are an important reservoir of MERS-CoV; in this study, MERS-CoVs sampled from UAE camels are sequenced and they demonstrate that the outbreak viruses emerged repeatedly from the animal reservoir.
(HH A, B, C) and two sporadic cases (Table 1, Figure 1 ). Activities involved in this investigation were reviewed by CDC and by the Health Authority of Abu Dhabi and were determined to be an urgent public health response that did not constitute human subjects research.
| Camel sample collection
Nasopharyngeal swabs from dromedary camels were collected in the UAE ( Figure 1 camel which presented with mucopurulent discharge. This male camel belonged to a farm located in the Western Region, which was linked to human infection reported 10 Mar 2014.
| Sanger sequencing and deep sequencing analysis
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus genomes were amplified by 32 pairs of nested, genome-spanning RT-PCRs, in 50 ul reactions or in nano-volume reactions using the Fluidigm Access
Array Hunter et al., 2016) . When sample quality or quantity was too low, the spike and/or nucleocapsid (S/N) genes were sequenced using alternative nested PCR primers. Sanger data were analysed using Sequencher 5.0. Next-generation sequencing data were analysed using a custom workflow in CLC Genomics Workbench 8.5 (Qiagen, Hilden, Germany). Adapters, and an additional 26 bp, were trimmed from each end to remove any residual PCR primer sequence. Remaining reads were trimmed from the 3′ end using a CLC cumulative quality score of 0.05. Trimmed reads were aligned to a reference, and a consensus sequence was called based on regions that had 10× or greater coverage.
Variants from the reference sequence comprising at least 5% of reads were identified by the quality-based variant detection algorithm in CLC Genomics Workbench, using a neighbourhood radius of 5, minimum neighbourhood quality score of 25 and a minimum central quality score of 29.
| Phylogenetic and molecular dating analysis
The final consensus genome sequences after Sanger and Illumina sequencing were aligned with the available complete or near complete MERS-CoV genomes in GenBank using MUSCLE (Edgar, 2004) . Similarly, Spike gene and protein sequences were aligned.
Phylogenetic trees were then inferred using the maximum likelihood (ML) method available in phyml version 3.0 (Guindon et al., 2010) using a general time-reversible (GTR) model with a discrete gammadistributed rate variation among sites (T 4 ) and a SPR tree-swapping algorithm. To construct a time-scaled tree, we first identified and removed all the recombinant sequences using RDPv4 (Martin, Murrell, Golden, Khoosal, & Muhire, 2015) , and the remaining full genome alignment was then analysed in beast v1.8.3 (Drummond, Suchard, Xie, & Rambaut, 2012) , using HKY + Gamma4 substitution model and an uncorrelated lognormal relaxed molecular clock. Genome and S protein alignment and Single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) visualization were performed using Harvest (Treangen, Ondov, Koren, & Phillippy, 2014) .
| RESULTS
| Sequence analysis of six clusters of human-tohuman transmission in the UAE
Respiratory samples were collected from confirmed MERS-positive individuals from three HCA, three household clusters and three sporadic cases from the UAE in 2013 and 2014 (Figures 1 and 2) . Using genomewalking Sanger sequencing and/or Illumina amplicon sequencing, we were able to obtain full genome consensus sequences (30,123 bases) from a total of 19 available patient specimens. We obtained S and N gene sequences for an additional four samples that failed full genome sequencing ( Figure 2 , Table 1 ). Alignment of these sequences with the other known MERS-CoV sequences showed >99% genetic identity. Single nucleotide polymorphism analysis of the aligned full genome sequences from this study against the HCoV-EMC/2012 sequence showed a range of 98 to 113 nucleotide (nt) variations scattered along the genome (Figure 3a) .
Comparison of the spike genes to the HCoV-EMC/2012 strain showed a total of 31 SNPs (Figure 3b ), causing nine amino acid (AA) changes, but none of these mutations appear to be distinct to these clusters. All sequences generated in this study were deposited in GenBank (Table 1) . (Table 1) . There is insufficient epidemiological data to clarify this discrepancy. Genomes from the other three direct contacts in HH cluster C to 2014_008 differ by one-two nt (Table 1) .
Genetic relatedness of MERS-
| Minor variant analysis
We performed a minor variant analysis on the available nextgeneration sequencing (NGS) data to investigate whether or not MERS-CoV exists as a diverse population in humans, as it does in camels , and to identify relationships between MERS cases based on minor variant associations. For the analysis, we ran CLC's quality-based variant detection algorithm using 5% as a conservative cut-off. We observed mixed bases distributed throughout the genome in each sample without noting obvious hot spots. This analysis shows that at position 11775 in index patient 2014_008, bases T and C are present at almost an equal number of reads, coding for amino acids as isoleucine (base T) or threonine (base C). However, in the HCA cluster III and HH cluster C, only one nucleotide or the 
| Phylogenetic analysis of the UAE cases and their relatedness to camel MERSCoV genomes
To understand how the 2013-2014 UAE viruses relate to other known outbreak and camel strains, camels were sampled from regions of the UAE corresponding to human MERS-CoV cases. We sequenced MERS-CoV genomes recovered from three camels (1B-A, 2B-E and 1H-F) near the KSA border, two camels (3B-C and 1H-D) from a farm near Al Ain and one camel (1H-B) from a farm in the Western Region, also linked with a known human case ( Table 2 ). The sequences recovered from these camels were very similar to the human MERS-CoV sequences in this study, differing by 3-8 nt, compared to the nearest UAE human MERS-CoV sequence (Table 2) . Further, we constructed maximum likelihood trees on the full genomes and S genes (Figure 4 , Figure S1 ). The majority of human and camel MERS-CoVs sequenced in this study belongs to lineage 2 as defined by Sabir et al., (2016) . Figure S1 ). Another case (2014_XXX) had no available case information, but notably, its genome sequence is phylogenetically linked to the three camel MERS-CoV sequences (seven nt difference) which were sampled from the KSA/UAE border in this study (1B-A, 2B-E and 1H-F) ( Figure 4 , Table 2 ).
To further define when the outbreak MERS-CoVs emerged with respect to other clusters and to the camel viruses, we constructed a time-scaled tree using BEAST ( Figure 5 ). Our estimation of evolution rate was between 6.5 × 10 −4 and 9.2 × 10 −4 for the entire MERSrelated genome dataset (recombinants excluded). Under that rate, the divergence date between UAE clusters and the Al Hasa cluster was most likely before August 2012 ( Figure 5) . Furthermore, the divergence date of the genome at Node A, the common ancestor of human and camel viruses associated with UAE cluster HCA III and HH C, is 
| DISCUSSION
Genomic studies of MERS-CoV with accompanying epidemiology are important and can reveal spatiotemporal transmission chains to support epidemiologic investigations from a zoonotic event with subsequent human-to-human transmission. These studies may also lead to improved understanding of the underlying genotypic mutations that drive phenotypic changes. Larger transmission events, like those in Al Hasa, Jeddah and Korea Oboho et al., 2015; Park et al., 2015) provide opportunities for molecular epidemiological analysis to understand whether changes in the virus genome lead to increased transmission, better fitness or adaptation to treatment. In spring of 2014, there was a steep increase in the number of MERS-CoV cases reported to WHO. This study demonstrates that these outbreaks in the UAE are likely due to independent zoonotic transmission events followed by nosocomial amplification which is consistent with the epidemiological investigations Hunter et al., 2016) .
In the UAE during 2013-2014, there appear to be six independent introductions of the virus, emerging from the same lineage (lineage 2) (seven, including imported case 2014_032). Unsurprisingly, sequences within each human cluster were very close at a nucleotide level, and in general, did not vary more than three nucleotides within the same transmission chain (Table 1) . Further, we did not identify any signature amino acid changes in the spike genes associated with the larger transmission clusters. Thus, there is no compelling genetic evidence for a more transmissible virus, rather, the high rate of transmission was likely due to the close contact of the patients with MERS.
This study provides temporal, geographic and genetic data linking actual human infections (clusters and sporadic cases) to camel MERSCoV. It is now clear that dromedary camels are a major reservoir of | 331
MERS-CoV and an important species in transmitting the virus to humans (Alagaili et al., 2014; Azhar et al., 2014; Ferguson & Van Kerkhove, 2014) . We know that several of the index cases in this study had close contact with camels from different regions of the UAE (Al Hunter et al., 2016) . Here, we show genomic evidence linking Table 2 ). Additionally, the 2013_002 case, who lived near the KSA border and had frequent contact with camels, harboured a MERS-CoV sequence closely linked to a camel-derived sequence from KSA already published in GenBank (Muhairi et al., 2016) . The fact that the camel from Dubai (KP719927) is closely related to HH A cases suggests that MERS-CoV may have been imported to an Abu Dhabi camel market from Dubai.
The camel-and human-derived MERS-CoV sequences do not phylogenetically segregate based on host, rather, animal and human viruses are interspersed throughout the trees. This suggests repeated independent introductions or cocirculation between camels and humans, as has been concluded in other cases Drosten, Kellam, et al., 2014; Memish et al., 2014 . A newer study examining camel MERS-CoV isolates observed that although there were only a handful of differences between strains at the consensus level, there were hundreds of intrahost variants (Borucki et al., 2016) . Appreciating this phenomenon will help in more accurately and robustly identifying and dating transmission pairs and in understanding variants associated with fitness.
This study provides genomic information complementing an epidemiological investigation of a MERS-CoV outbreak and provides evidence that the outbreak viruses emerged from camels either directly or in the months leading up to the outbreak. The molecular data generated here support and clarify the contact tracing records and provide contextual information to potential future outbreaks.
These data will be important in determining what molecular changes in the virus may lead to increased transmission between humans.
Exposure to camels is a risk factor for human MERS-CoV infection, and undoubtedly, new cases will continue to emerge. Surveillance of camels on the Arabian Peninsula and in eastern Africa has shown a high rate of seropositivity as well as some MERS-CoV shedding (Alagaili et al., 2014; Corman et al., 2014; Haagmans et al., 2014; Müller et al., 2014; Raj et al., 2014; Reusken, Haagmans, et al., 2013) . There is a camel MERS-CoV vaccine in development (Haagmans et al., 2015; Song et al., 2013) , but in the near term, it is critical that individuals exposed directly to camels take precautions to minimize the risk of MERS-CoV transmission. Broader genetic and/or culture-based screening of camel populations is needed to understand the prevalence and distribution of coronaviruses and other viruses which may cause disease in humans.
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